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Nationalist Background of China's Foreign Policy

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GREAT-POWER CHAUVINISM—THE MOTIVE FORCE OF MAO'S POLICY IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 83

The first signs of deviation from socialist principles in Chinese foreign policy became apparent in 1957. By 1963 this trend had developed into a clear-cut political line intent on satisfying the great-power ambitions of the Mao group. Today the Chinese Communist Party leadership are capitalizing on the people's patriotic feelings and desire to restore the country's prestige as a great power to instil bourgeois-nationalist, chauvinistic ideas.

Intensified nationalism in China is, above all, associated with the Mao personality cult which had come about even before the victory of the people's revolution and laid the imprint of subjectivism on subsequent policy of the Chinese leaders. Apart from that, the shift of China's foreign policy towards chauvinism was due to objective historical, social, class and economic reasons, to internal and external circumstances surrounding the formation and struggle of the Chinese Communist Party.

The interplay of various social and historical factors gave rise to a multitude of peculiarities with regard to the Maoist ideological platform. These peculiarities included the combination of nationalism and petty-bourgeois "revolutionism;" the tendency to use the world revolutionary movement as an arena of struggle for nationalist ends; the combination of a great-power foreign policy and a domestic policy of socialist construction and, at times, even attempts to use the advantages of the socialist system for chauvinistic aims in international affairs (accelerated socialist transformations in the village in 1954-55, forced rates in economic development in 1958-59).

The Chinese leaders' nationalism is largely a result of their capitulation to the petty-bourgeois element in the unique conditions of the anti-colonial and anti-feudal revolution in the biggest Asian country, in which a gigantic territory and huge population with a wealth of historical and cultural traditions was saddled with a low level of economic, social, scientific and political development. The Chinese Communist Party leadership lacking a good grounding in the theory of Marxism-Leninism, was isolated from the Chinese working class and the international communist movement for a long time. Consequently, it did not go through the school of proletarian struggle or acquire world revolutionary experience, and proved incapable of opposing petty-bourgeois or even outright bourgeois nationalism. Many Party leaders themselves voiced nationalist views. For example they absolutized the experience of the bourgeois-democratic stage of the Chinese revolution and applied it to the stage of socialist construction. Today they are trying to force their pet dogmas on the international working-class and liberation movement.

Requisites for the Development of Nationalism in Chinese Foreign Policy

China's leaders are doing their best to camouflage the nationalist intent of their foreign political programme with ultra-left, revolutionary-vanguardist verbiage. In China's distant past, and even to the present, one can easily trace a number of factors which doubtlessly facilitated the spread of chauvinistic sentiments and led to outbreaks of chauvinism at certain historical periods and, in the final analysis, were conducive to the penetration of great-power ideas in the present-day foreign policy. Some of these factors are analysed below.

SOURCES OF GREAT-POWER AND SINOCENTRIC CONCEPTS

The concepts of China's grandeur and the Chinese people's superiority over other nationalities date back to the epoch of feudalism. Probably that was due to the fact that a highly viable civilization had sprung up on Chinese territory, a civilization that gradually assimilated or influenced many neighbouring peoples with lower social and cultural standards. Those concepts were gaining ground as the centralized Chinese state developed into East Asia's biggest nation in territory and size of population, the most powerful politically and economically.

Such was the basis of the chauvinistic, sinocentric doctrines of Chinese feudal ideology. For ages they had been cultivated by the ruling classes, inculcated in the people's minds, gradually becoming an element of the national psychology of a considerable portion of the population.

Feudal China's "traditional" foreign policy, which was mainly based on expansionist ambitions, developed under the influence of these factors. Chinese politicians considered extent of territory the major attribute of grandeur.

It was in feudal times of territorial expansion that alternated with periods of decline when the Chinese state became weaker and its territory dwindled under the pressure of the external forces, that the major principle of great-empire foreign policy was formulated—restoration of all territorial losses and retention of territory within the farthest borders (naturally, this did not prevent China from expanding beyond those borders since they had been set only as the minimum objective of its territorial policy).

Thus emerged the sinocentric, international juridical principle that historical precedent justifies external territorial expansion. Under this principle any territory, no matter who had owned it before or what people inhabited it, was regarded

as an integral part of China only because it had been annexed by China at some time in the past.

In its endless feudal wars China was often defeated and itself became the object of aggression by neighbouring countries. China's cultural and economic superiority and central position in East Asia made the throne of Chinese emperors a tempting inducement and the object of foreign invasions. It meant power over China and its vassals. Several imperial dynasties were founded by foreign conquerors, the last of them were the Yuan (Mongol) dynasty, 1280-1367, and the Ching (Manchu) dynasty, 1644-1911. Despite the lengthy and stubborn fight waged by the Chinese people against the foreign invaders, Chinese feudal tradition recognized the "legitimacy" of foreign dynasties, regarding the subsequent Chinese national dynasties as their lawful heirs. Consequently, according to Chinese feudal law the principle of territorial restoration applied equally to conquests by Chinese and foreign dynasties.

The long history of relations between the militant Chinese state and its neighbours evolved a specific Chinese political doctrine, "conquer barbarians at the hands of barbarians," i.e., take advantage of the existing contradictions or initiate new ones among China's probable enemies, so as to crush them one by one.

Similar ideas—modified to conform to present-day realities—often crop up in scientific and political literature published in the Chinese People's Republic (such as the exclusiveness of Chinese history, the special revolutionary mission of the Chinese people, the progressive role of predatory wars, etc.). They also find expression in the foreign policy conceptions of the Maoist group.

The Chinese Communist Party leadership, too, have been influenced by some principles of Chinese feudal law. In particular, they are inclined to consider People's China the legitimate heir of all dynasties that ever ruled China, even the Ching (Manchu) dynasty, regardless of the fact that from the late 19th century to 1912 the Chinese bourgeois revolution developed under anti-Manchu slogans. The well-known article "Further Reference to the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat," published by the *Jenmin jihpao* in 1956, said: "We Chinese must never forget that during the rule of the Han, Tang, Ming and Ching dynasties our country was also a great empire. . ."

In the 60s, encouraged by the Party leadership, Chinese historians took the next step and began to extol foreign conquerors (Jenghiz Khan, for one) for their "progressive" contribution to Chinese history, finally arriving at an outright apology of annexation and forcible assimilation of other peoples. A leading Chinese historian wrote in 1962: "It is wrong to consider expansion of territory as aggression, to proclaim weak and dying nationalities the object of aggression and sympathize with them. The actions by a strong nation or state to expand accord with the laws of social development of their time. . ."[1]

ANTI-IMPERIALIST TRADITIONS

When new times came (late 18th century) China, where the development of capitalist relationships was already under way, began to feel the mounting pressure of European capitalist countries and later of the United States and Japan. The feudal system in China was then undergoing an acute crisis, embodied in the struggle against foreign (Manchu) domination. The Tai Ping peasant rebellion and the movement of the bourgeoisie (particularly of its radical wing) proceeded under anti-dynasty (anti-Manchu) slogans. The bourgeoisie drew on the traditions of struggle against the Mongols and Manchus and tried to revive and adapt the entire feudal-chauvinistic ideological arsenal to their political purposes.

That strongly influenced the development of nationalist views among the bourgeoisie, part of whom preached racial superiority, the cult of strength and Messiahship, all of which found expression in various theories of the special historical role of China.

In the mid-19th century the pressure of capitalist powers on China grew into military intervention. It ended in the country being divided into spheres of influence and its subjection to a humiliating regime of capitulation based on a system of inequitable agreements. Until the victory of the bourgeois-democratic revolution in 1949 the imperialist powers fought to retain the capitulation regime and at times even tried to turn all or part of China into their colonies by military force. Before 1921, when the Chinese Communist Party was formed and the proletariat emerged on the Chinese political scene, the struggle against European colonialists had been headed by the young Chinese bourgeoisie, whose revolutionary potentiality had not been exhausted. The bourgeoisie appeared as a political force under nationalist and anti-imperialist slogans of restoring the nation's independence and former might and abolishing the system of inequitable agreements.

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[1] Shin chanshe, 1962, No. 1, p. 52.

At the time the Communist Party was founded, certain traditions of anti-imperialist struggle had already developed in China. After assuming the leadership of the anti-feudal, anti-colonial revolution on behalf of the working class, the Chinese Communist Party outlined its strategy and tactics which were based on utilizing inter-imperialist contradictions—the struggle for spheres of influence in China. The revolutionary movement involved the middle and petty bourgeoisie, as well as militarists, landowners and representatives of other exploiter classes. It was due to the broad-term interpretation of the programme of a united anti-imperialist front that the way to revolution was opened for bourgeois-nationalist and feudal-chauvinistic elements. In 1935 a policy was worked out whereby all who so desired could join the Communist Party irrespective of social origin. The class criterion was not considered in the formation of the Red Army either (officers from militarist armies were recruited). Representatives of the wealthier sections of the population were assigned to govern the regions controlled by the Red Army.

The national-liberation fight against Japanese imperialism (1937-45) was of particular significance in the growth of nationalist influence on the policy of the Chinese Communist Party. The end of the civil war between the Kuomingtang and the Chinese Communist Party created favourable opportunities to implement the policy of a single anti-imperialist front. On the other hand, the atmosphere of national upsurge favoured the spread of erroneous concepts of the essence and

nature of the united front with the upper classes and facilitated the penetration of nationalist elements into the Communist Party and consequently the nurturing of nationalist sentiments. During the seven years of war against Japan the Communist Party membership grew more than fifteenfold. It must be borne in mind that the Japanese-occupied or Kuomingtang-controlled territories included the main industrial centres and therefore the growth in the Communist Party membership consisted almost entirely of the peasantry and bourgeois intelligentsia that had fled to the liberated regions. The leadership's policy permitted alien class elements to join the Chinese Communist Party. They were the bearers of bourgeois-nationalist and feudal-chauvinistic sentiments which found response in the petty-bourgeois element and increasingly influenced Party policy.

During the bourgeois-democratic revolution, particularly at the last stage, there was cooperation between the Communist Party and the bourgeoisie. The main principles of this cooperation were outlined in the theoretical works of the Chinese leaders whose conceptions included an exaggerated idea of the revolutionary potential of the Chinese national bourgeoisie, the class which came to be regarded not only as an ally at the bourgeois-democratic anti-colonial, anti-feudal stage of the revolution but also as a "part of the people," an ally of the proletariat and the peasantry during the whole period of transition to socialism.

After the victory of the People's Revolution the objectives of the national anti-imperialist struggle remained valid with regard to the policy of isolation of the Chinese People's Republic pursued by the USA and particularly with regard to direct US intervention in China (occupation of Taiwan and the Peng-hy Lieh-tao Archipelago) and the neighbouring countries (aggression against Korea, Vietnam and Laos).

Today the Mao Tse-tung group are following a policy of preserving the bourgeoisie as a class. Chinese bourgeois elements are even repatriated from abroad and are granted economic, legal and other privileges. National bourgeoisie hold both economic and political positions, thereby helping to maintain nationalist narrow-mindedness.

Making a dogma of the experience of the anti-colonial struggle in alliance with the bourgeoisie, the Chinese Communist Party leaders ignore the negative aspects of bourgeois nationalism. They apply their own petty-bourgeois conception of a united anti-imperialist front to the sphere of international anti-imperialist struggle. They either ascribe the "revolutionary traits" of national (Chinese) bourgeoisie or features of Chinese compradoreship to the monopoly bourgeoisie in the capitalist countries of the so-called "second intermediary zone" depending on their political position with regard to the United States.

THE "PEASANT LINE" IN THE CHINESE REVOLUTION AND NATIONALISM

Apart from the influence exerted by the national bourgeoisie on the policy of the CPC leadership during the revolution, the fostering of nationalism in the Communist Party of China was also due to the development of the "peasant line," which meant the leadership's capitulation

under the pressure of the petty-bourgeois element.

The anti-feudal character of the Chinese revolution made the problem of drawing the peasantry into the revolutionary fight a central issue. Quoting a well-known Mao Tse-tung statement, Liu Shao-chi said in 1948: "The peasant question is the central issue of the democratic revolution in our country." [1]

Proceeding from this indisputable thesis, however, the Chinese leaders gradually came to oppose the "revolutionary village" to the "reactionary" town trying to theoretically substantiate their assertion about "the leading" role of the peasantry in the Chinese revolution and the world revolutionary process. They began to regard the peasantry as a leading force and the mainstay of the democratic dictatorship of the people. "The political system of new democracy," Mao Tse-tung said in 1940, "actually amounts to granting power to the peasantry."

Little by little the Chinese theoreticians began to supplant the thesis of hegemony of the proletariat in democratic revolution by the thesis of hegemony of the peasantry "elevated to the level of the proletariat." Analysing the "sinosized form of Marxism" Anna Louise Strong wrote in her article "Thoughts of Mao Tse-tung" that the Chinese "Marxists" had given new meaning to the concept of the "proletariat" as the class basis of the Communist Party.

The Chinese revolution was anti-colonial as well as anti-feudal. Therefore in the earlier stages and particularly during the war against Japan the Chinese Communist Party strove to make the utmost use of the anti-imperialist potential of bourgeois nationalism and inculcate a national consciousness in the peasantry. This was only natural since the peasantry formed the mass basis of the bourgeois-democratic revolution and was the striking force in the armed struggle against the imperialist intervention and internal counter-revolution. The peasantry proved very fertile soil for bourgeois-nationalist ideas which combined well with traditional feudal-chauvinistic conceptions. Though anti-imperialist in orientation, the nationalist ideas acquired a reactionary character (xenophobia, ideas of national isolation and racial superiority, etc.).

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[1] Liu Shao-chi, Victory of Marxism-Leninism in China, Peking, 1959, p. 6.

The development of the "peasant line" in the policy of the Communist Party resulted in a blend of nationalism and petty-bourgeois revolutionism; in nationalist extremism and the development of a nihilist attitude to the experience of the international proletariat; in vanguardist and hegemonic claims. The leadership did nothing to eradicate the harmful consequences of the development of nationalism. On the contrary, a number of very important political steps taken during the last stages of the revolution actually amounted to giving in to the pressure of bourgeois nationalism. Mao Tse-tung and his supporters time and again initiated political campaigns against the influence of the international proletariat. They came out against the internationalists in the Communist Party who demanded that the experience of the revolutionary struggle and socialist construction of the fraternal Communist Parties should be heeded.

After 1960 the Chinese leadership's petty-bourgeois extremism was evident in the theoretical programme envisaging unjustified "acceleration" of the revolutionary process regardless of objective conditions. As for practical policies, it was manifest in the Maoists' readiness to subordinate both internal (socialist) construction and foreign policy to the nationalist goals of hegemony, which they intended to gain even at the cost of splitting the socialist camp and the world revolutionary movement.

The Nationalist Line and Phases of Its Development

INTERNATIONAL CONDITIONS DURING DEVELOPMENT OF THE NATIONALIST POLICY

During the few years immediately following the victory of the revolution objective conditions were such that the Maoists could not disclose their hegemonic ambitions. Economic havoc, political instability and the menace of American intervention were compelling China to draw closer to the camp of socialism since it was the only way of safeguarding its revolutionary gains.

Furthermore, after 1949, the Soviet Union's tremendous influence on China's economic and cultural development, the nationalization of the compradore capital and imperialist possessions, and setting up of the state sector in the economy led to intensive development of socialist elements in all aspects of the economy and culture. This process hampered the development of petty-bourgeois ideology, in particular nationalism, limited the freedom of criticism of scientific socialism and compelled the supporters of Mao's policy to harken to the Chinese proletariat and benefit from the experience of socialist construction in the fraternal countries.

The latest campaign of petty-bourgeois opposition to the world proletariat started in 1956-57. The peculiar combination of internal and external factors determining the development of the Chinese People's Republic explained, to a considerable degree, the Chinese leaders' candid proclamation of the nationalist foreign policy.

The last decade of world development has been characterized by the consolidation of the socialist camp, high economic development rates in the socialist countries and their gradual transition to new, more progressive forms of interstate economic cooperation—the prospect of levelling out economic development and of a more or less simultaneous transition to communism by all socialist countries. The Soviet Union's supremacy in the world scientific and technical revolution and ability to create practical means of curbing imperialist aggression have again graphically demonstrated the advantages of the socialist system.

The strengthening of the socialist camp has given rise to a new international situation. The capitalist world, after futile attempts to exert pressure on the socialist community by means of cold and hot war, has been compelled to consider the concept of peaceful coexistence and economic competition. The change in the world balance of forces in favour of socialism has intensified the process of decay of the colonial system and extended the possibilities for the newly-liberated nations to take the path of non-capitalist development. At the same time conditions are now more favourable for the proletarian anti-imperialist struggle in the capitalist countries, and the possibility of the peaceful transition from capitalism to socialism has become more likely. For the first time in history there is a real possibility of preventing war by curbing the imperialist states' aggressive ventures, easing world tensions and consistently pursuing a disarmament policy.

Carried away with their petty-bourgeois revolutionism, the Chinese leaders think they can speed up the world revolutionary process, force "socialization" on the world, not stopping at military conflicts or even the peril of a global nuclear war. Such is the conclusion to be drawn from the Maoist concept of the role of war in history—the basis of the so-called theory of people's war.

A major part of the Maoist doctrine is devoted to questions of war, its role in the historical process and its character in the contemporary epoch. The Mao group believe that war as a social phenomenon is inevitable. On the other hand, they point to the social consequences of the First and Second World Wars and associate the development and victory of revolutionary movements with military developments. They maintain that the victory of socialism on a world scale will be scored through the military defeat of imperialism's war and political machine.

Having a primitive idea of the role the United States is playing in the world today, they reduce the world revolutionary process to armed struggle against American imperialism. The theory of "people's war" determines the chief motive force of the revolutionary process (world peasantry), its target (American imperialism) and general strategy (local wars).

Though they believe that a world thermonuclear conflict would limit the sphere of imperialist domination or even bring about the final triumph of socialism, the Chinese theorists assert that local wars are the instrument by which imperialism will be destroyed as a world system. The theory of people's war lends itself to understanding the strategy of local wars not only as reaction to acts of aggression but also as a strategy of preventive measures justified by the militant nature of imperialism. This was evidenced by the so-called "punitive" operation of the Chinese armed forces in the Taiwan Straights in 1958. While attacking the off-shore islands, the Chinese leaders were perfectly aware of the danger of a local war with the United States in that region and accepted the possibility of terrible sacrifices their people might have to make. But the idea behind their planning was to involve the Soviet Union in a military conflict with the United States. To their twisted way of thinking that would mean the victory of their "revolutionary" strategy. Thus the Soviet Union's resources were to serve China's adventurous policies. The Mao group were not discouraged by the fact that the "local" conflict would surely flare up into a world war.

China's stand on the Vietnamese war actually amounts to the same thing, the only difference being that in this case the victims of the "people's war" are the Vietnamese people who are making very real and not hypothetical sacrifices.

Equally candid are the hopes for war entertained by some advocates of Chinese neo-Trotskyite conceptions. Their idea is to "Vietnamize" Latin America, Africa and Asia and thus make it possible to eliminate the power of monopoly capital by smashing imperialist forces in local armed conflicts.

The policy of forced "socialization" of the world is expressed concretely in the opposition of Chinese theorists to the policy of peaceful coexistence and peaceful economic competition, to the idea of gradual solution of the problem of disarmament, to the probability of peaceful transition from capitalism to socialism and other favourable prospects resulting from the change in the balance of forces to the advantage of socialism.

The period under review is marked by the collapse of the colonial system and the upsurge of the national-liberation movement which involves, above all, the multi-million masses of peasantry in Asia, Africa and Latin America, i.e., agrarian countries which are lagging far behind in social and economic development. Many of them have no industrial proletariat but they are part of the world capitalist market. Their ruling circles are susceptible to various ideas and movements, particularly nationalism which is rapidly spreading among the masses of petty bourgeoisie rallying them in the struggle against colonialism.

Some sections of the radical bourgeois intelligentsia in these countries, carried away by the ultra-left rhetorics of the Chinese platform and the romanticism of petty-bourgeois "revolutionism", lose their sense of reality to such an extent that they do not even notice Chinese nationalism turning into downright chauvinism and mistake Chinese extremism for revolutionism.

Sometimes these "critical minds" go as far as to spread Mao's ideas, thus voluntarily or involuntarily supporting his hegemonic ambitions. Take the so-called China Policy Study Group composed of professors and other British intellectuals in London. The sheet they publish has long since become the advocate of Chinese nationalism, readily giving extensive favourable coverage to the stand of Mao Tse-tung and his supporters.

The development of the national-liberation, anti-colonial revolution is accompanied by a revival of nationalist movements under extremist slogans among national minorities which strive to isolate themselves from the nation-wide movements and from the proletariat. It also stimulates petty-bourgeois extremism and influences some Communist and Workers' Parties resulting in their deviation from the principles of proletarian internationalism.

As a matter of fact, the Chinese leaders welcome such turn. They have launched an unprecedented campaign in the international working-class and national-liberation movement with the object of recruiting followers of the proletariat who are dissatisfied with the "slow" tempo of the revolutionary development. They do not even shun renegades who only seek means of fighting the Marxist-Leninist parties, or declassed elements seeking an easy life at the expense of Peking political adventurers.

However, it would be wrong to attribute shifts to the "left" beyond common sense, that occur in the modern radical movement wholly to Chinese propaganda and schismatic activities. These shifts stem from objective factors in the development of the world revolutionary process. One such factor is the mounting tide of petty-bourgeois element brought about by the present-day anti-imperialist struggle of the colonial and dependent peoples. Adoption of the Chinese ideological and political platform by certain social groups in different countries is due to the fact that the Chinese revolution developed and triumphed as a major integral part of the general world process of abolishing the colonial system.

The Chinese Communist Party, leading the people's revolution in a semi-colonial and semi-feudal country, experienced the ever growing influence of bourgeois nationalism combined with peasant ideas of bringing about a just reconstruction of the world. Due to this influence the bitter and lengthy struggle in the Chinese Communist Party ended in the triumph of Maoism which theoretically reflected petty-bourgeois nationalist sentiments.

In conditions of the upsurge of the national-liberation movement at the new, third stage of the general crisis of capitalism and the Chinese leadership's struggle for ideological hegemony in the world revolutionary movement Maoism has won supporters both among the masses fighting against colonialism and among extremist elements in the working-class movement in Europe, the United States and Australia. China's Communist Party leaders take into account and capitalize on the turbulent upsurge of the national-liberation movement and its typical petty-bourgeois impatience, ideas of redistribution of wealth, and national and racial prejudices, i.e., the sentiments and ideas they (Chinese leaders) have already incorporated in their ideological platform.

The hegemonic ambitions of the Mao group on the world scale are particularly evident in the attitude towards the national-liberation movement as seen from the following theoretical maxims: the national-liberation movement is the decisive force of the world revolutionary process; the Chinese revolution is the vanguard of the national-liberation movement; China is the centre of the world revolutionary movement and international politics. The immediate objective of the Chinese Communist Party policy is to isolate the national-liberation movement from the international working-class movement, which is proved by its rejection of joint anti-imperialist action.

The Chinese leaders try to influence the national-liberation movement by opposing Marxism-Leninism to Maoism which they depict as a revolutionary theory pertaining to the rapid radical liberation of the colonial peoples. Chinese propaganda strives to prove that, in contrast to Maoism, Marxism-Leninism thrusts the peoples onto the long and tortuous path of "peaceful" social and economic evolution. They counter the policy of peaceful coexistence and economic competition with imperialism with their quasi-revolutionary strategy of "accelerated" emancipation of humanity by destroying imperialism's military and political might in wars.

DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONALIST ORIENTATION IN CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY

The 20th Congress of the CPSU in 1956 was a major milepost in the development of the communist movement. It condemned the personality cult and its aftermath—dogmatism in ideology, in the domestic and foreign policies of the Communist parties and socialist countries and in the international communist movement. The way the Chinese leaders reacted to the Congress and the elimination of the consequences of the personality cult revealed their vanguardist claims. Immediately after the Congress two articles were published, approved by the Politbureau of the CPC Central Committee, on the historical experience of the dictatorship of the proletariat. They were critical of the Congress resolutions and questioned the policy of eliminating the personality cult.

Before that, too, the CPC leadership had shown certain vanguardist aspirations. Back in the mid-20s some CPC leaders came out in Party periodicals with a thesis on the shift of the centre of world revolution to China. Proceeding from that faulty premise some leftist party leaders tried in 1930 to push through their plan of organizing uprisings all over China. They hoped this would incite an armed conflict between Japan and the Soviet Union which would develop into a world war. In this way, they believed, China would become the vanguard of world revolution.

At the 7th Congress of the Communist Party of China in 1945 the leadership's vanguardism ran into countering Marxism-Leninism with Maoism. The Party Rules adopted at the Congress stated that in all its work the Party was guided by the ideas of Mao Tse-tung.

At the Conference of Trade Unions of Asia and Oceania held in Peking in 1949 the Chinese leaders proposed that all peoples fighting for national liberation should follow the line of Mao Tse-tung.

Ever since the mid-50s they have been attempting to assume leadership of the world revolutionary process. At that time they still were unable to break with the socialist camp and the fraternal Communist Parties and limited themselves to trying to discredit socialist policies, proposing instead a petty-bourgeois and ultrarevolutionary internal and foreign policy. At the same time they were doing their utmost to engineer the Communist Party of China into the central position in the united international communist movement and win ideological hegemony.

A heated ideological struggle developed round the decisions of the 20th Congress of the CPSU. The Chinese Party leaders reacted to the Congress's creative spirit and proletarian orientation with an outburst of dogmatism and leftist adventurism. They began to resort to certain revisionist deviations in some Communist Parties in predominantly agrarian countries to attack Marxism-Leninism.

The Chinese delegation to the 1957 Moscow Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties attacked the thesis on the possibility of peaceful transition to socialism, thus attempting to orientate the fraternal parties to a critical revision of the 20th Congress resolutions on this question.

In April 1960 the Chinese leadership published the article "Long Live Leninism" and a few others timed for the 90th anniversary of Lenin's birth, outlining their ideological platform and stressing the problems of war and peace.

At the 1960 Moscow Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties the Chinese delegation again attempted to foist their anti-Marxist views regarding major issues of today. Faced with the danger of complete political isolation from the world communist movement, the Chinese representatives were compelled to sign the Conference documents mapping out the general line of the world communist movement although the Chinese leadership were already opposed to its main theses.

The hopes of subjecting the socialist camp to Chinese hegemony and making it the economic and military-strategic base for the realization of the great-China schemes in the international scene proved futile.

After a short period of "quiet defence" (1961-62) the Chinese rulers came up with a new plan and new tactics. In their polemics with the Marxist-Leninist majority in the international communist movement they formulated their ideological programme ("Proposal on the General Line of the International Communist Movement," June 14, 1963) and foreign policy.

The splitting policy on the world scene was intended to band together a group of states, parties and organizations that would recognize Mao Tse-tung's paternalistic claims. Though in a limited form, this would help establish the hegemony of the Chinese People's Republic and create a basis, or at least a semblance of one, for collective opposition to the Marxist-Leninist orientation of the international communist movement.

This policy only heightened the nationalist line in Chinese foreign policy and resulted in China's self-isolation from the socialist camp and the majority of the fraternal Parties, and its repudiation of joint action in the struggle against imperialism.

In their struggle against the Marxist-Leninist Parties the Chinese leaders have been developing old and evolving new theoretical propositions: the concept of "reliance on one's own strength" and the faulty assertions about bourgeois degeneration of some fraternal Parties and socialist countries meant to justify their hegemonic claims.

The Chinese leadership's position in the international communist movement only further exposed the Mao group's nationalism in foreign policy despite attempts to camouflage it with Marxist phraseology.

INTERNAL CONDITIONS AFFECTING THE DEVELOPMENT OF CHINA'S NATIONALIST POLICY

After mapping out in 1952 an economically substantiated plan of industrialization and gradual socialist reshaping of agriculture, the cottage industry, private capitalist industry and trade, to be carried out in three five-year periods (1953-67), the Chinese leaders practically discarded it in 1955 and began to accelerate collectivization in the village, seeking to enforce socialist production relationships as soon as possible. That was a reflection of their petty-bourgeois idea of socialism inasmuch as transformation of small-scale agricultural commodity production into socialist production was associated with collectivization of property and labour without taking into account the material and technical basis of socialism.

In his introduction to the collection of articles "Socialist Upsurge of the Chinese Village" in 1955 Mao Tse-tung gave reasons for the directive of the 6th Plenum of the CPC Central Committee on the completion (for the most part) of semi-socialist cooperation in agriculture by 1957 and the final transformation of semi-socialist cooperatives into socialist during the next 3-4 years, i.e., by 1959 or 1960, which was 7-8 years before the planned time. Moreover, Mao Tse-tung made the rate and scale of the development of industry, science, culture and education, that is, the entire socio-economic development of the country, dependent on the accelerated rates of agricultural cooperation. Thus the Chinese theorists proclaimed the village the leading force in socialist reconstruction in China.

However, the Chinese Party leadership soon found the time set for collectivization and industrialization would take too long. The appearance of serious opposition to the adventurous policy of forced socialist transformations made Mao hasten the realization of his plans. The situation was made even more difficult since the opposition, in its criticism of the Mao policy, tried to go by the experience of socialist construction in the Soviet Union. Addressing the conference of secretaries of provincial, urban and regional Party committees on July 31, 1955, Mao Tse-tung said: "Some comrades have found grounds in the history of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union for criticizing the so-called precipitate acceleration of collectivization of agriculture in our country today. I feel we should consider the experience of the Soviet Union. We must cut short any tendencies towards precipitate acceleration, without the proper preparation, without taking into account the level of consciousness of the peasantry. On the other hand, we must not allow some of our comrades to use the Soviet Union's experience to cover up their views in support of advancing at a snail's pace".

In September 1957 the Mao group launched a mass campaign against opposition which included a covert nationalist anti-Soviet, great-China line and was a political preparation for an attempt to outstrip others in the field of socio-economic developments, thus creating the basis for satisfying their vanguardist ambitions on an international scale.

This turn in domestic affairs coincided with the first serious differences between the Chinese leaders and the international communist movement. The fraternal Parties did not support the theses of the Chinese leaders set forth in their articles and speeches after the 20th Congress of the CPSU. Vigorous objections were voiced against Mao's "optimistic" estimation of the consequences of nuclear war, the geo-political slogan that "the Eastern wind prevails over the Western wind", his proposition that it is impossible for the dictatorship of the proletariat to wither away in the socialist countries while imperialism still exists as a world system, etc.

The situation at that time apparently strengthened the Chinese leaders' belief that only by domestic consolidation and decided progress in economic development could they attain a dominant position in the socialist camp and the international communist movement. The second session of the 8th Congress of the CPC (May, 1958) issued the directive on maximum industrial development rates (the "great leap forward") and the reorganization of agricultural production cooperatives into village communes. The implementation of the new policy was accompanied by vociferous propaganda operating with padded figures to describe the economic "successes", by slogans of building socialism ahead of schedule, by labelling Soviet experience in economic development as conservative, etc.

That adventurous attempt to achieve fantastic rates of development regardless of social and economic conditions in the country was naturally a failure. By 1960 agriculture had been pushed back several years and the hasty organization of the communes had sharply reduced commodity production, making difficult the supply of foodstuffs and industrial raw materials to the towns. "Minor metallurgy" and small-scale industry failed to yield the expected results; economic proportions had been upset, undermining the basis of planning. The disorganized national economy, unfavourable weather conditions and natural calamities that hit a number of regions in 1959-61 caused serious food shortage.

Nevertheless the Chinese leaders persisted in attempts to impose their own line on the international communist movement. The unfavourable circumstances in which they were made determined the bitterness of questions raised by the Chinese leadership, their shift from ideological polemics to political struggle and, finally, to splitting tactics, to open attacks on Marxism-Leninism and the general line of the international communist movement.

THE "CULTURAL REVOLUTION" IN CHINA—A NEW STAGE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF CHAUVINISM

The movement hypocritically called the "great proletarian cultural revolution" was launched by Mao Tse-tung and his clique in early 1966. From the outset it was clear that it was connected with their nationalist programme. It was a new attempt on the part of the Chinese leaders for hegemony in the world revolutionary movement despite repeated failures at home and in international affairs. Hence their desire to attach international significance to the "cultural revolution." "The revolutionary, rebellious flames kindled by socialist China must spread to the whole of the world! Hungweipings should appear in every corner of the planet!" declare the "red guards". Similar ideas were time and again expressed in programme speeches by a number of Chinese leaders supporting Mao. Chen Yi, for one, called the "cultural revolution" a "great venture in the international communist movement," which "will have an invaluable, far-reaching effect on the course of world revolutionary development at present and in the future."

Between 1956 and 1960 it became clear that the Chinese leaders' hopes of gaining ideological and political hegemony in the socialist camp and turning the socialist countries into junior partners of the Chinese People's Republic were futile. The 1963-66 period saw the crushing defeat of plans to subject the national-liberation movement of the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America solely to China's influence, making this movement the instrument of its nationalist policy. The world at large witnessed a series of setbacks in Chinese foreign policy which exposed the chauvinism of the Maoist group and brought China to the brink of political isolation.

Among the major failures on the international scene in the years immediately preceding the "cultural revolution" were the refusal of Asian and African leaders to support the Mao line to isolate the Afro-Asian peoples from the socialist camp and unsuccessful attempts to use the racial motive to prevent the Soviet Union from participating in the Second Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference to be held in Algiers in 1965. The First Tri-Continental Conference in Havana in 1966 and the session of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Organization in Nicosia in 1967 were fresh blows to China's great-power claims. The Chinese delegation was not supported in either case. The Council of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Organization rejected those claims, cancelled its earlier resolution on holding the Fifth Conference in Peking and decided to convene it in Algiers instead. Maoist attempts to involve the peoples of Asia and Africa in armed adventures, to create fresh seats of tension and "people's war" were also smashed. Their interference in the Indo-Pakistani conflict to hamper a political settlement revealed to the world at large the adventurism of their foreign policy. Their stand on Vietnam is plain proof of their chauvinistic indifference to the fate of small nations. The tragic consequences of the events of September 30, 1965 in Indonesia where the Maoist conception of acceleration of the revolutionary process was given a practical trial was a great, if not the greatest, blow to Mao Tse-tung's prestige on the international scene.

The foreign policy defeats coupled with economic and social setbacks at home demonstrated the bankruptcy of Mao's ideological and theoretical platform. Mao's tactics of splitting the revolutionary forces in his struggle for hegemony had the opposite effect—it undermined the authority of the Chinese leadership and narrowed the circle of his supporters in the world. World-wide criticism of the platform and policies of the Peking rulers, particularly their anti-Soviet policy which has practically isolated the CPC from the international communist movement, has intensified resistance to the adventurous line on the part of healthy forces in China.

Faced with the threat of growing opposition, Mao Tse-tung gradually managed to organize a regrouping of forces in the Party leadership and have it approved at the 11th Plenum of the Communist Party Central Committee in August 1967. In this, he appealed directly to the petty bourgeoisie, students and declassed elements in the towns most infected with personality cult prejudices and survivals of great-China chauvinism. He mobilized them to attack the Communist Party and those who adhered to the ideas of scientific socialism and the principles of proletarian internationalism and associated China's future with the socialist camp. Those who fought for the consolidation of unity with the socialist community, for accepting its assistance and the experience of socialist construction fell victims of the hungweiping ravings.

The "cultural revolution" as a whole can be regarded as a stage of petty-bourgeois revival initiated by Mao in 1957-58 when he tried to establish his pseudo-revolutionary vanguardism in international affairs by pursuing the home policy of the "great leap forward" and people's communes. In other words, the "cultural revolution" is the continuation of Mao Tse-tung's chauvinistic policies.

The "cultural revolution" is also a new stage in Mao's foreign policy. Since their illusions of hegemony in the socialist camp and the national-liberation movement have been scattered, the Chinese leaders have begun to entertain ever-greater hopes of an armed conflict between imperialism and socialism, counting on China's tremendous population to help it gain supremacy over nations laid low by a thermonuclear war. In this way they objectively act at one with the most reactionary imperialist quarters which consider war the deliverance from communism. There is curious logic in this development of Chinese foreign policy: anti-Sovietism is becoming the dominant stimulus in Maoist foreign policy and anti-Americanism is losing its anti-imperialist orientation, making it a doctrine of militant nationalism playing on the Chinese people's patriotic feelings.

The Striving for Hegemony— the Major Manifestation of Nationalism in Maoist Foreign Policy

Certain bourgeois-nationalist distortions have repeatedly manifested themselves in the policy of the Chinese Communist Party at various stages of its history. Within the country they amounted to disregard for Leninist principles in the solution of the nationalities problem: denial of the peoples' right to political self-determination, colonization of national provinces and a policy of assimilation in keeping with great-Han traditions. As for international affairs, nationalism is manifested in the territorial principle: "China is whatever is populated by the Chinese." A nihilistic approach to the experience of the international working-class and the liberation movement has always been typical of some CPC leaders, and particularly so of Mao Tse-tung himself. The emigration policy is also influenced by nationalism: Chinese emigration and Chinese communities in other countries are used to serve nationalist aims.

Significant though these elements of "classical chauvinism" are, the most striking feature of nationalism in Maoist foreign policy today is the striving for hegemony, for a domineering position in the world, for using the international revolutionary movement as an arena of struggle for their selfish interests.

SUBORDINATION OF CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY TO VANGUARDIST OBJECTIVES

If domestic political affairs and trends in economic construction are analysed along with foreign political actions and general orientation, if theoretical requisites and evolution of the Chinese leaders' views are studied, it will become clear that the prime objective of the Chinese leadership is to attain hegemony, and their entire foreign policy is outlined with that in mind.

This is plainly revealed in the analysis of China's attitude to the imperialist, developing and socialist countries. In each case the policy is directed against the main rival whose weakening might permit increased pressure on a certain group of states.

The Imperialist Camp. The anti-imperialism of Chinese foreign policy stems from the character of the Chinese anti-colonial revolution. After the defeat of Japanese imperialism followed by US aggression in the Far East and Southeast Asia, Chinese foreign policy became predominantly anti-American in its orientation.

Immediately after the war the Chinese leaders began to interpret the anti-colonial struggle as spearheaded against American imperialism exclusively. Liu Shao-chi wrote in 1949: "...on the one hand, the modern nationalities question amounts to the plunder and oppression of the peoples of the world, or the desire for plunder and oppression, on the part of the American imperialists, and on the other, to the opposition of the peoples of the world to plunder and oppression, to the struggle for national liberation and defence of national independence."

Subsequently the Chinese leaders reduced the whole complex issue of the anti-imperialist movement to the fight against the United States and evolved their specific doctrine of anti-Americanism which, under the guise of anti-imperialist slogans, has a nationalist meaning.

Having a primitive idea of intra-imperialist antagonisms the Chinese leaders cherish illusions of politically influencing the capitalist countries of the "second intermediary zone" by cultivating anti-American sentiments.

At the same time by forcing their concept of "people's war" on the national-liberation movements Peking wants them to provoke and draw the fire of American imperialism, and pin down its forces, making it possible for the Chinese leaders to follow their policy of confrontation with the United States without a serious risk or too great an effort.

The Developing Countries. The conflict between the Chinese People's Republic and India exposes the former's hegemonic schemes with even greater clarity.

The policy of non-alignment and struggle for relaxation of international tension, as well as the policy of economic development by setting up a fairly powerful state sector in industry, and a number of other positive aspects of Indian policies have won it popularity in countries of the "third world." Moreover, some sections of the national bourgeoisie in the developing countries are attracted by the "third" (social-reformist) way of social and economic development which has been chosen by the ruling classes of India.

India's growing prestige in the "third world" narrows the sphere of China's influence, discredits its extremist methods of anti-colonial struggle and threatens the idea of setting up an international anti-American front under the leadership of the Chinese People's Republic, a front in which the countries of the "first intermediary zone" would be the main motive force.

Thus, of the "first intermediary zone" countries, India has become China's main rival for leadership. The fact that after China India is the biggest country in Asia, that it is China's immediate neighbour and that its leaders declare they are set on socialist development, makes this competition all the more acute.

The armed conflicts with India in 1959 and 1962 and the attempt to spur on the Indo-Pakistani conflict in 1965 are largely explained by the desire of the Chinese political leaders to force India to discard its non-alignment policy and undermine its prestige in the "third world."

The Socialist Camp. The Mao group's hegemony intentions are quite evident in China's relations with the socialist camp and the international communist movement. This is, above all, due to the fact that hegemony in the world communist movement is one of their most cherished goals.

In its struggle for hegemony in the socialist camp and the international communist movement the Peking leadership directs its main effort to discrediting the Soviet Union and the socialist community as a whole. It resorts to malicious inventions, slander, social demagogy, unseemly political tricks and direct provocations which only disclose the falsity of their appeals to proletarian internationalism.

CHAUVINISM AND THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S NATIONAL INTERESTS

Nationalism was one of the principal ideas of the Chinese revolution. It embodied the people's desire to get their country out of the humiliating position it was in under imperialist enslavement. The broad programme of delivering China from the shameful system of political and economic dependence, eliminating its backwardness and restoring its sovereignty in the world united different classes and social strata. At times their alliance became so broad it even included former feudal classes.

Influenced by the international proletariat, the healthy forces in the Chinese Communist Party who appreciated the role of the industrial proletariat in modern society and more consistently defended national interests used the progressive aspects of nationalism to convince the peasantry of the advantages of socialism. The Chinese national bourgeoisie, politically weak as it was, had to give in and allow the Communist Party, supported by the people, assume the leading role. That created the conditions for the bourgeois-democratic revolution to develop into a socialist revolution. At the same time the bourgeoisie obtained certain economic and political positions in the system which the Chinese theorists define as a democratic dictatorship of the people.

When China embarked on socialist development it inherited not only the survivals of bourgeois influence, but, in part, the objective basis of nationalism—for various reasons some concrete problems of the anti-colonial revolution remained unsolved, such as the restoration of Chinese territories which had been annexed by imperialist powers at different times: Macao (Portugal), Hong Kong and Kowloon (Britain), Taiwan, the Peng-hy Lieh-tao Archipelago and some off-shore isles (the United States).

Today China is making much slower progress than it should in attaining economic independence, the vital issue for all developing countries. To the present day there is political and economic discrimination on the part of a number of countries towards the Chinese People's Republic, and its rights at the United Nations have not been restored.

These are just a few of the problems that remain to be solved. It goes to show that the national aspirations which the people of China fought for during the revolution have not been completely satisfied, that the progressive potentialities of nationalism have not been exhausted. Obviously, these potentialities can still play a definite role in Chinese foreign policy.

The Marxist parties would not be opposed to this. China's foreign policy is not being criticized as nationalist because the Chinese leaders are still turning to account the progressive aspects of nationalism to repulse imperialism, even though the Chinese revolution has entered its socialist stage. This criticism arises from the fact that the Chinese leaders employ the most reactionary aspects of nationalism to attain their great-power goals, proclaiming China's "special" mission and "special" rights.

The Chinese leaders' approach to the problems of the Chinese people's anti-colonial struggle is characterized by the changeover from the former general line in foreign policy (struggle against imperialism in cooperation with the other anti-imperialist forces, above all, those of socialism) to a new line—the struggle for hegemony in which the struggle against imperialism plays an important, but auxiliary role.

As far as tactics are concerned this new orientation manifests itself in the fact that the Mao group easily give up consistent anti-imperialist struggle even in cases concerning the national interests of the Chinese people, subordinating these interests to their chauvinistic ambitions.

The way the Mao group deal with some national issues which were not settled during the bourgeois-democratic stage of the revolution vividly illustrates their betrayal of national interests for the sake of chauvinistic objectives.

Elimination of the Remnants of Colonialism. The Chinese government tolerates the presence of British and Portuguese colonies on its territory, colonies which have no moral right, and have long since lost any legal right to exist.

The reason for such tolerance is, above all, the fact that Hong Kong and Macao are the most important sources of convertible currency (500-700 million dollars annually). But for these currency "injections" China would not have been able to make good the foreign trade deficit caused by the reorientation of foreign trade to the capitalist market. Apart from that, Mao Tse-tung and his clique need convertible currency to finance their splitting activities in the international communist movement and for other political adventures.

In view of the nationalist policy towards withdrawal from the socialist camp Hong Kong and Macao have become so important that the Chinese leadership has no desire to hasten the liquidation of the colonial regime there. This was evident from the events in Macao and Hong Kong in 1966 and 1967. It became clear then that the government of China capitalized on the anti-imperialist potential of the Chinese colonial population only to exert pressure on the local authorities and the governments of Britain and Portugal to gain additional economic and political privileges in these colonies. Moreover, the Chinese government not only ignores the question of

doing away with the colonies but actually opposes the idea of democratization of the colonial regime and granting wider political rights to the Chinese population.

Mao Tse-tung thus betrays the vital interests of the four million Chinese still in colonial slavery for the sake of his "special" policy.

Struggle Against Economic Backwardness. China could have overcome economic backwardness by following the road of socialist transformation of society. There were extremely favourable conditions for that: the might of the socialist camp ensured high rates in economic progress and guaranteed China's security against imperialist aggression, thus relieving Chinese economy of the need to expend considerable manpower and funds on defence.

Having set themselves the objective of elevating China above the socialist camp, the Chinese leaders launched their policy of prematurely accelerating economic development rates. When they failed they went as far as to practically sever economic relations with the socialist countries making autarchy the principle of their relations with these countries and thereby depriving the Chinese people of an opportunity to benefit from the favourable conditions of socialist construction and pushing way back the solution of such problems as building a planned socialist economy, raising the standard of living and delivering China from dependence on the capitalist market.

In its effort to gain dominance China began to manufacture its own nuclear weapons regardless of the harm it would do to the national economy.

Attempts to Overcome International Isolation. The Maoists' hegemonic tendencies have inevitably led them to abandoning the struggle against discrimination in international affairs and resorting to means which only contribute to China's political isolation. For Maoists, normal relations are conceivable only with states which go along with their policy or which Peking has designs on in its struggle for influence. In the latter case it entails the most unscrupulous compromises with imperialist countries and struggle against socialist countries on the international scene.

By his splitting policies in the international communist movement and isolationism Mao Tse-tung segregates his nation from the influence of progressive social forces.

At the same time, to provide a basis for their claims to leadership of the world revolutionary process, the Mao group are following an extremist policy in international relations, rejecting the principle of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems, relaxation of international tension and large-scale international cooperation. Today when there is a real possibility of restoring China's rights at the United Nations, they raise obstacles to it thus maintaining China's political isolation and limiting the influence of socialist China with regard to international relations.

The Border and Territory Question. During the first years of its existence the Chinese Government took a number of measures to settle border questions with its neighbours, Burma and the Mongolian People's Republic. Later, however, the Chinese leadership began to cause friction and even engineer armed conflicts along Chinese borders and laid claim to Soviet and Mongolian territory based on historical precedents in the spirit of great-power feudal traditions.

Thus, despite the fact that Mongolia has existed as an independent state for more than forty years now and regardless of the results of the 1946 plebiscite which even the Kuomintang recognized, the Chinese leaders have repeatedly raised the question of "restoration" of the Mongolian People's Republic to China, even in 1954 during talks with the Soviet government delegation in Peking and in Mao Tse-tung's well-known message to Japanese socialists in 1964. It follows that Peking permits the preservation of colonies on Chinese territory and at the same time attempts to deprive a socialist nation of its sovereignty.

The Chinese government's territorial policy also serves nationalist purposes: border conflicts help maintain international tension and support the country's political regime; territorial claims contribute to heightening nationalist sentiments in China.

The cited examples plainly indicate that Mao's foreign policy runs counter to the country's national interests. Therefore, when it comes to the reasons hindering the solution of national problems of the Chinese revolution one must take into account not only imperialist opposition and the influence of colonial survivals on China's international relations but also the subordination of foreign policy to the leadership's chauvinistic aims.

Maoism—Theoretical Basis of Chinese Foreign Policy

Maoism as a system of views is based on the ideology of certain predominantly petty-bourgeois social groups, which emerged during the collapse of the colonial system and developed under the influence of socialist ideas, particularly Marxism. Considering the experience of the bourgeois-democratic revolution in China in the light of this ideology, the Chinese leaders have made a dogma of this experience both as to its internal aspect (extending it to the period of a socialist revolution) and international aspect (considering it an absolute law of all anti-imperialist revolutions). The Chinese leaders' views on foreign policy (if freed of polemical and other embellishments to suit the needs of the time) are also based on absolutized concepts borrowed from the history of the Chinese revolution.

At the same time Chinese theorists do not suffer from slavish worship of theory. Proceeding from the voluntarist slogan "policy is the commanding force" the Peking leaders substitute subjective scheming worded in Marxist terminology and quoting Marxism but in fact profoundly hostile to that revolutionary teaching for comprehensive theoretical elaboration of world problems nowadays; their theoretical scheming is directed against "modern revisionism," i.e. against the Communist Parties adhering to Marxism-Leninism and preventing the Chinese leadership from realizing its hegemonic ambitions. The practical purpose of these schemes is to substantiate, defend and assert the great-power claims of Mao Tse-tung and his supporters in international affairs.

APPRAISAL OF IMPERIALISM

The Chinese theoretical views on imperialism were influenced by the fact that the Chinese revolution was primarily anti-colonial, i.e., dealt with imperialism only as an external military and political force. As it follows from the theoretical pronouncements of the Chinese leaders and from their political documents, they do not at all agree with the Leninist comprehensive characterization of imperialism as the monopoly stage of capitalism but reduce it solely to a system of colonial enslavement of the peoples by mother-countries. Mao Tse-tung wrote in 1940: "Imperialism is dying capitalism, but it is precisely because it is in its last stages that it increasingly feeds on the colonies and semicolonies and will not, under any circumstances, allow a capitalist society of bourgeois dictatorship to be established in any of them."

The Peking interpretation of imperialism is very close to the primitive semantic approach, whereby imperialism is understood only as a policy of states, irrespective of their social systems, directed to setting up, expanding and retaining "empires." This approach makes it clear that the Chinese theorists associate the destinies of imperialism mainly with the process of collapse of the colonial system, that is, with the elimination of Asia, Africa and Latin America's colonial dependence on imperialism (chiefly American). In their theoretical conclusions they assert that "... the cause of the revolution of the international proletariat as a whole depends, in the final analysis, on the revolutionary struggle of the peoples living in these regions..."[1] As for the struggle of the proletariat, everywhere, including the socialist camp, it is regarded as a minor factor and an auxiliary base of the national-liberation struggle in the colonies.

According to Peking, the elimination of imperialist domination over the dependent nations is not an integral part of the world revolutionary process developing under the leadership of the proletariat and under the decisive influence of the socialist system, but an isolated national-liberation struggle of the "coloured" people of Asia, Africa and Latin America, separately from the socialist countries and the proletariat in the mother-countries and to some extent even despite them.

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[1] Proposal for the General Line of the International Communist Movement, Peking, 1963, p. 14.

Reducing the struggle against the capitalist system to the fight against colonialism the Chinese leaders underestimate the significance and reactionary intent of the policies pursued by the imperialist states which have lost their colonies (Federal Germany, Italy, France, Japan). They focus attention on the United States as the irreconcilable enemy of all peoples and governments and just about the only country guilty of neo-colonialism. To their way of thinking, the development of relations in the imperialist camp is actually a process of the United States' swallowing up "former" imperialist powers.

INTRA-IMPERIALIST CONTRADICTIONS AND THE UNITED STATES

Peking theorists also deny the Marxist-Leninist thesis to the effect that the contradiction between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, between socialism and capitalism is the major decisive contradiction of the contemporary world. By substituting a series of contradictions of different character and different significance for the basic contradiction, they provide a "theoretical" basis for arbitrarily deciding what, at a given moment, is to be considered the principal, most acute contradiction depending on political expediency. A vivid illustration is their current exaggeration of intra-imperialist contradictions. Direct reference was made in the article "Further Comment on Comrade Togliatti's Differences with US": "From the standpoint of the vital interests of the imperialist countries the contradictions and clashes between them are for them more pressing, more immediate and more real than their contradictions with the socialist countries."

They refrain, however, from a concrete analysis of intra-imperialist contradictions. Instead, they draw up a primitive scheme of all "decolonized" powers banding against the United States.

This scheme is based on a system of faulty references including the following groundless assertions:

The United States is allegedly the common enemy of all other capitalist countries since American expansion threatens their political and economic independence;

Hence the contradictions between the United States and the rest of imperialist powers are antagonistic;

The leading force in the struggle against American imperialism is the monopoly bourgeoisie which is the most anti-American by virtue of its position in society.

In view of this, Peking politicians would have the attitude to the United States be the criterion of revolutionary spirit, and qualify the imperialist rivals of the American monopoly bourgeoisie (the French bourgeoisie, for one) as part of the "anti-imperialist camp" because of their differences with the United States.

In this way the competitive struggle against American capitalism waged by the imperialist powers is identified with the anti-imperialist struggle of the national bourgeoisie in the colonies, and intra-imperialist contradictions are quoted as the motive force of the liberation movement.

Peking's approach to intra-imperialist contradictions is analogous to the strategy of the Chinese Communist Party in the bourgeois-democratic revolution. The Chinese leaders maintained that the success of their strategic plan (the possibility of setting up revolutionary bridgeheads) depended on the existence of contradictions between the imperialist powers in semi-colonial China. It is also by analogy with the Chinese revolution, particularly its concluding phase, that the Chinese leaders make schemes of union with the bourgeoisie and attaining hegemony under nationalist slogans of anti-Americanism.

NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT AND THE HEGEMONY OF THE PROLETARIAT IN THE WORLD REVOLUTIONARY PROCESS

A major thesis of the "special" general line of the world communist movement, as proposed by the Chinese Communist Party leadership, is the assertion that another basic contradiction of our time is between the national-liberation movement and imperialism. It is based on opposing the drastic forms of liberation struggle in the colonies which Peking calls genuinely revolutionary, to the less drastic "peaceful" development of the proletarian movement in the advanced capitalist countries and to the peaceful economic competition between the socialist and capitalist systems, considered as reformist.

Analysing the rapid collapse of the colonial system and the practice of drastic, armed forms of struggle against the colonialists that the colonial peoples must resort to, the Peking theorists have drawn the following conclusion, erroneous but extremely useful for their hegemonic plans. They assert that the "zone" of Asia, Africa and Latin America is the focal point of all contradictions of today and the main zone of revolutionary upheaval, the region where the destiny of imperialism is being decided. The centre of the world revolutionary movement, they allege, has moved from Europe to the East, to China.

The wrong assessment of contemporary contradictions in the world, the underestimation of the revolutionary potentiality of the international proletariat and the socialist countries, and the anti-Marxist interpretation of imperialism give rise to another major thesis of the Chinese leadership. They assert that it is the national-liberation movement in the colonies rather than the proletariat that is the decisive force in the struggle against capitalism. This conception is utterly at odds with the Marxist-Leninist concept of the hegemony of the proletariat in the bourgeois-democratic revolution. The absolutization of the experience of the Chinese revolution which proceeded in a country with a small proletariat, has led the Maoists from the correct evaluation of the revolutionary role of the peasantry in the Chinese revolution to the erroneous assertion that the national-liberation movement, actually petty-bourgeois in character, is the leading force in all revolutionary transformations and that the petty-bourgeoisie rather than the proletariat is the predominant force of the world revolutionary process.

Proceeding from the faulty proposition of the decisive role of the national-liberation movement in the world revolution, the Chinese theorists

reject the idea of the hegemony of the proletariat in the world revolutionary movement in general, and, above all, the concept of the revolutionary role of the world socialist system. The article "Apologists of Neo-Colonialism" labels the concept of the hegemony of the international proletariat in the national-liberation movement, an indisputable concept for all Marxists, as "the crudest distortion and revision of the Leninist idea."[1]

Naturally, the Chinese theorists offer their own interpretation of the principles of proletarian internationalism. By replacing the concept of the world revolutionary process by the concept of the national-liberation revolution they actually reject the requirement of proletarian internationalism that the interests of the movement as a whole be taken into account.

They suggest that the international proletariat give up the struggle against the monopoly bourgeoisie in the citadel of imperialism and limit their effort to support anti-colonial movements. Meanwhile the socialist countries, they believe, should postpone socialist construction and the transition to communist construction, give up the economic competition with imperialism and concentrate on the armed support of the national-liberation movement.

The Chinese leaders need Mao's special platform defining the role of anti-colonial struggle in the revolutionary process to justify hegemonic pursuits on the international scene. Chinese propaganda persistently dwells on the idea of China's leadership in the national-liberation struggle of the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America on the grounds that China is the biggest Eastern country and that the Chinese Communist Party has valuable experience of anti-colonial struggle and leadership of the multi-million peasantry and that Maoism—"sinosized Marxism"—is the most suitable ideology for the East.

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[1] Apologists of Neo-Colonialism, Peking, 1963, p. 23.

EAST AND WEST

It has already been mentioned that Chinese feudal ideology was replete with sinocentric concepts. In appraising the international position of the Chinese People's Republic the Peking rulers oppose the East (headed by China) to the West (headed by the United States), which can be very naturally taken for a modern modification of the feudal chauvinistic idea. It is manifested in the concept of the prevailing "East wind," a generalized idea of the special historical mission of the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America, their racial unity and common fate in view of "white" colonialism, of the irreconcilable geographical and political conflict between the East and the West, etc.

Criticized by the Communist Parties the Chinese leaders tried to present the pretentious formula "the Eastern wind prevails over the Western wind" as an expression of the balance of forces between the camp of socialism and the capitalist world. But Mao's own interpretation of this slogan is something quite different. This is what he said at the 1957 Moscow Conference of

Communist and Workers' Parties:

"Who is stronger, the under-developed or advanced countries? Who is stronger, India or Britain, Indonesia or Holland, Algeria or France? To my mind all the imperialist countries are in a position which is like the position of the sun at 6 p.m., but ours is like the position of the sun at 6 a.m. Thus the tide has turned. And this means that the Western countries have been left behind, that we have outdistanced them considerably. Undoubtedly, it is not the Western wind that prevails over the Eastern wind, for the wind from the West is so weak. Undoubtedly, the Eastern wind prevails over the Western wind, for we are strong."

It follows from this and many other statements and particularly from the analysis of Chinese foreign policy that by the "East" they mean the under-developed countries—the "world village"—and the "West" is the synonym of the industrial powers of Europe and America—the "world town", a well-fed and therefore conservative part of the world population set against the hungry, hence revolutionary East. As a matter of fact, lately Chinese propaganda has been making it rather plain that the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries also belong to the West.

As in other cases it is easy to find an analogy with the pattern followed by the revolution in China where the Communist Party was supported by the anti-feudal and anti-colonial forces of the village and fought against reaction and the forces of imperialism that depended on the town.

By repeating the old conception in new conditions the Maoists encourage bourgeois sociologists and politicians to ignore the social character of the world revolutionary process, reducing it to anti-colonial revolution at the most, to a conflict between the East and the West, between the white and coloured peoples and thus to distract the proletariat from the struggle against monopoly capital.

On the other hand, this conception appeals to those of working-class movement ideologists who refrain from a Marxist analysis of the contemporary balance of class forces and find support in the Mao platform. For example the programme of the Italian Socialist Party of Proletarian Unity has stated that the crisis of the single strategy of the international working-class movement tends to deepen along the lines of division into industrial powers and economically under-developed countries.

Finally, the idea of dividing the world into East and West, into "town" and "village," into rich and poor nations has found its proponents among the ideologists of the national bourgeoisie in the developing countries. This is borne out by the Sukarno concept of emergent and decadent forces, which was accepted by Chinese propaganda sometime in the past.

The system of views worked out by the Mao group, a reactionary system close to racism, is meant to prove the incompatibility of the interests of the international proletariat and world peasantry. It finds practical application in attempts to drive a wedge between the socialist camp and the international proletariat, on the one hand and the national-liberation movement, on the other.

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Of utmost importance for a correct understanding of the policy the Chinese leadership pursued with regard to the socialist countries is the system of views which can be defined as a concept of "degeneration of socialist states." Proceeding from the experience of class struggle in China during the bourgeois-democratic revolution and the transition period, the Peking theorists are trying to prove that throughout the entire period up to the triumph of the communist system, i.e., during the transition period, there exists in a country building socialism social and class basis for the rebirth of capitalism which is sustained by imperialist encirclement. In other words, the possibility of socialist transformation is made dependent on external factors.

The Chinese theorists have vulgarized the Marxist idea of the internal social and economic basis of revolutions and interpreted it in a nationalist way. Citing the experience of socialist construction in the Soviet Union in conditions of capitalist encirclement and the experience of economic development of the liberated regions during the civil war in China, they make a dogma of the principle of "reliance on one's own strength" as the basis of relations among the socialist countries and relations between the socialist countries and the developing states.

A prominent place in Chinese contemporary political views is given to the dogmatized generalization of the experience of the armed struggle the Chinese Communist Party waged against internal reactionary forces and foreign intervention during the people's revolution. This experience has been made the starting point in building up the armed forces and evolving the modern military doctrine. In their foreign political aspect the military theories of Maoism proclaim the CPC's leading role in the world revolutionary process both ideologically (identification of revolution with violence) and politically (creation of the means of military pressure on the international situation).

This brief outline of some Maoist concepts makes it possible to assume that despite all the pragmatism Chinese government policy is based on a definite theoretical foundation. And the generalizing foreign policy doctrine of "intermediary zones" rests exactly on this basis.

Conception of "Intermediary Zones"

This conception is built round the idea of consolidation of all international anti-American forces irrespective of their social nature, and their subordination to the aims of Chinese foreign policy.

The first outline of this conception was made by Mao Tse-tung in an interview to the American journalist Anna Louise Strong in August 1946, soon after the end of the Second World War, when the United States went over to the cold war policy and direct intervention in China. Later on the political hypothesis on the existence of some intermediary zone between the United States and the Soviet Union underwent a certain evolution, acquired new content and the significance of official political doctrine. The contemporary version of this doctrine is as follows:

The socialist camp is not opposed to imperialism as a world system, but to the United States. Between the socialist camp and the United States there lies a vast intermediary zone—a conglomeration of states, the only thing they have in common being that all of them are or will be objects of American aggression.

An attack on the socialist camp, the Peking theorists maintain, is inconceivable as long as the USA is busy subjugating the countries of the intermediary zone. Consequently it is in the intermediary zone that the struggle against American imperialism unfolds.

This is how the Chinese leaders express this view: "... Seizing the opportunities that have been offered by the new post-war conditions the American imperialists, who have come to replace German, Italian and Japanese fascists, are attempting to knock together an unprecedentedly vast empire in the world. The immutable strategic aim of American imperialism is aggression in the intermediary zone situated between the United States and the socialist camp to establish its control there, strangle the revolutions of the oppressed peoples and nations and then do away with the socialist countries, enslaving and subjecting to American monopoly control all the peoples and countries of the world, including America's allies."[1] According to Mao Tse-tung, the intermediary zone consists of two sub-zones: *"The first intermediary zone"* includes Asian, African and Latin American countries which have already won or are fighting for independence. This is the decisive motive force of the anti-imperialist, or to put it more precisely, anti-colonial struggle—the world "peasantry," an analogue of the Chinese peasantry in the united democratic front in China.

"The second intermediary zone" includes the advanced industrial powers of Western Europe, the Pacific Basin (Japan, Australia), and Canada. These countries, as Peking theorists see it, have a dual nature: while being exploiters themselves, the monopoly bourgeosie in these countries is also exploited by the United States. Moreover, unlike the American monopoly bourgeoisie, they have lived through the period of "decolonization." Therefore as US aggressiveness is exposed more and more and the process of "decolonization" intensifies, the countries of the "second intermediary zone" may go over to anti-American (anti-imperialist, to the Peking way of thinking) positions and in this aspect come closer to even the socialist countries and the countries of the "first intermediary zone."

This doctrine, too, obviously points to the analogy with the position of the national bourgeoisie in the united democratic front of China.

As a more comprehensive expression of the Chinese leaders' political views, the "intermediary zone" theory serves as a starting point in working out the guidelines of foreign policy.

The Peking theorists hope that it will be possible to form an international, anti-American front under their auspices by means of the forces of the "intermediary zones," within their boundaries. This is how a programmatic article in *Jenmin jihpao* commented on Mao Tse-tung's theory of "intermediary zones": "All forces, except for American imperialism and its stooges, may unite. Though the peoples of the world have different political convictions and the states have different social systems, there is not a single state or people in the world that is not threatened by the peril of aggression from the United States. This is an objective basis for setting up the broadest united front against American imperialism."[1]

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[1] Proposal on the General Line of the International Communist Movement, Peking, 1963, p. 11.

The setting up of such a front is the prime task of Chinese foreign policy. It is assigned the role of the main instrument of overthrowing American imperialism. But in reality the meaning of the nationalist doctrine of anti-Americanism is much broader. By following a policy of confrontation with the United States under anti-imperialist slogans, the Peking politicians try to gain the reputation of a revolutionary force for China, and conceal the selfish intentions of their anti-American policy. They even try to justify Peking's policy of anti-Sovietism, which has its own motives, special aims and significance for the Chinese leaders, by the pretext of struggle against American imperialism.

International tension is considered the most favourable political atmosphere for making practical use of the anti-American potential of the "intermediary zone." According to the Chinese leaders, world tension makes American imperialism expose itself more quickly and fully and

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[1] The Forces of the World, Coming Out Against American Imperialism, Unite!. Jenmin jihpao, January 12, 1964.

that, in turn, consolidates the anti-American forces.

In a talk with representatives of a number of Latin American Communist Parties in 1959, Mao Tse-tung said: "A superstition exists in some countries that international tension is unfavourable for the peoples. But in conditions of international tension the Communist Parties can develop more rapidly, the rate of their development can be higher."[1]

Thus, international tension is supposed to keep up the revolutionary potential, hence the struggle to ease tension is considered capitulation to imperialism. This explains the Chinese leadership's negative attitude to the disarmament policy and to banning nuclear tests, and to other political actions to ease international tension by reaching agreement with the United States and other imperialist powers.

The purpose of maintaining tension in the "intermediary zone" is also served by the principle defined as "spearhead against spearhead" which, to Peking's way of thinking, all participants in the international anti-American front should accept with regard to the United States. This principle is at complete variance with the policy of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems.

The practical realization of the principle "spearhead against spearhead" is exemplified by attempts to prod the socialist countries to go as far as provoking a new "Berlin crisis," to try to induce Pakistan to impair its relations with India, to raise obstacles to ending the Vietnamese war, etc.

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[1] Problems of Peace and Socialism, Prague, 1964, No. 6, p. 57.

At the same time Peking's political concepts establish a "relationship" between the revolutionary situation in the "intermediary zones" and the forms of struggle: the more acute the forms of revolutionary struggle, the more favourably the revolutionary situation develops. The article "We Hail the Successful Development of the Revolutionary Situation in the Congo" says: "The successful development of the revolutionary situation in the Congo proves one truth: regardless of the ruthlessness of armed suppression by imperialism and its lackeys, profound changes may take place in the revolutionary situation if only the revolutionary people take up arms."[1]

Nevertheless the Peking leaders claim they are the most consistent peace fighters. This belief of theirs is based on a sectarian attitude to the general democratic peace movement and opposing to it their "ultra-revolutionary" approach to the struggle for peace, which they understand as a series of "restraining" and diverting military-political measures and dodges. This includes the development of the armed fight in the colonies and dependent countries, which is supposedly the decisive factor curbing American imperialist aggressiveness; the proliferation of the nuclear weapon and even brinkmanship as it was during the crisis in the Taiwan Straights in 1958, etc.

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[1] **Jenmin jihpao, June 24, 1964.**

While verbally admitting the possibility of preventing war Peking consistently inculcates the idea of the futility of a policy forcing the imperialist governments to seek to relax international tension. As for the socialist countries' influence on the imperialist policies (forcing the policy of peaceful coexistence on them, pursuing the policy of economic competition and relaxation of international tension, etc.), the Peking leaders regard it as complicity between "modern revisionism" and imperialism.

To their mind, the movement for peace and prevention of war should be abandoned in favour of all-out struggle against imperialism since universal peace is associated with the victory of socialism on a world scale.

The Maoist conception is that socialist transformation of the world can only come about through armed struggle. Hence the conclusion that it is only by force of arms that war can be prevented, that it is only by war that war can be combatted. This idea was expressed by Mao Tse-tung back in 1936 in his work "Strategic Questions of the Revolutionary War in China" and lately developed in the "people's war" theory.

"INTERMEDIARY ZONES" CONCEP AND CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY

The "intermediary zones" theory is a political doctrine of militant chauvinism. It differs in that its nationalism is based on anti-imperialism which is mainly understood as a struggle against colonialism and its legacy, a struggle which has now become so important and bitter in view of the need for former colonial and dependent countries to choose their way of social development.

This doctrine is an instrument of making anti-imperialist sentiments among the colonial and dependent peoples serve Peking's hegemonic claims. The Chinese leaders are even ready to form blocs with traditional anti-Soviet forces in imperialist states while continuing their hostile policy towards the socialist countries. Moreover, they would like to provoke a conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union and take advantage of the situation to build up their economic and military potential and increase China's international prestige.

Relations with the United States. On the surface China's relations with the United States today are stern and uncompromising. The character and development of these relations have been determined by historical reasons and political expediency.

When anti-communism became an official state doctrine of the United States after the war, the policy of "restraining communism" was also extended to the Chinese Communist Party and the revolutionary movement it headed. The United States intervened in the 1946-49 civil war in China on the side of Chiang Kai-shek and supported him in the struggle against the Communist Party. Later the Chinese People's Republic encountered direct American aggression in the Far East (the Korean war) and Southeast Asia. This resulted in the anti-imperialism of Chinese foreign policy developing into anti-Americanism.

It has already been stated the Chinese leaders need their anti-American policy to bring pressure to bear on the United States and consolidate their leadership of the anti-American front. They also use anti-Americanism to develop and intensify the struggle against "modern revisionism" by accusing the Soviet Union and other socialist countries of complicity with American imperialism.

Today, however, Chinese foreign policy as a whole and particularly its line against the United States is undergoing a serious crisis. Formerly the effectiveness of China's anti-imperialist positions and its confidence in dealing with the United States largely depended on solidarity with the socialist camp and especially on the economic, political and military potential of the Soviet Union. Having failed in their attempts to force their extremist concept of the "people's war" on the socialist camp, the international working-class movement and the national-liberation movements and to undermine the policy of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems, the Chinese leaders switched over to a policy of anti-Sovietism. This brought about an entirely new situation in China's international position.

Nowadays the Chinese government is extremely cautious in its relations with the United States and tries to prevent the situation from becoming too dangerous and not to weaken its contacts with the American government. Today China's position in respect of the United States is a combination of vociferous anti-Americanism, when it comes to propaganda, and attempts at mutual understanding with regard to practical relations.

As for the United States, it still maintains its occupation forces in Taiwan and the Taiwan Straights, supports the anti-popular regime of Chiang Kai-shek and opposes the restoration of China's legitimate rights at the United Nations. It refuses China diplomatic recognition and retains its embargo on trade with China. In other words, the United States persists in its hostile policy towards China. But this is also only half true. Since 1960, behind the screen of hostility there has been serious revision of the policy towards China. This is due to the whetting of differences between the Chinese leadership and the international communist movement, deterioration of relations with the Soviet Union, renewed hopes of the American ruling quarters regarding the nationalist degeneration of the Chinese leadership and the possibility of reaching agreement with Mao Tse-tung and his supporters on the basis of anti-Sovietism.

Whereas in 1954-55 the Chinese leaders were the one who sought to normalize relations, adhering, as they did, to the principle of peaceful coexistence, today it is the American government that tries to interest the Chinese leaders in the prospect of normalizing and developing Sino-American relations.

The US government has already made a number of moves in that direction. It officially informed the government of China that it would use its "influence" to prevent the landing of Chiang Kai-shek's forces on the mainland; it has repeatedly assured Peking, in connection with the aggression in Vietnam, of the absence of any hostile intent as far as China was concerned; during the acute shortage of foodstuffs it offered grain deliveries; of late, it has unilaterally allowed Chinese journalists and scientific workers to come to the United States and American citizens to visit the Chinese People's Republic; Chinese films and literature, including the "Thoughts of Mao Tse-tung" in English, are imported to the United States.

So far the Chinese government prefers keeping its relations with the United States as they are. The truth is that the "cold war" situation is favourable for the nationalist goals the Chinese leadership is pursuing on the international scene. International tension helps them nurture anti-Soviet and anti-American sentiments. With this in mind, they try to preserve the hotbeds of tension and military conflicts in the Taiwan Straights, Indo-China and along the Sino-Indian and Pakistani-Indian borders. Peking's stand is also influenced by the fact that the United States is interested in normalizing its relations with China now that American aggression in Indo-China has reached an impasse. Peking hopes that by maintaining its tough policy it will be able to obtain bigger concessions from the United States with regard to its nationalist claims.

The conclusion to be drawn here is that Chinese government policy with respect to the United States is centered round the restoration of Taiwan and recovery of China's "traditional" influence in Indo-China and Southeast Asia. While combining its tough policy concerning the United States with anti-Sovietism Peking apparently hopes at the same time to reach agreement with the American imperialists as to spheres of influence and keeping them free of the influence of other forces.

The broader task of the Maoist policy is to use political measures to compel the United States to recognize the Chinese People's Republic as one of the major forces determining the course of world events even now, before it develops its economy, builds up its military, scientific and technical potential and gains political stature, to provide a realistic basis for its hegemonic claims.

Relations with the Countries of the "First Intermediary Zone" (colonial, dependent and developing countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America). The political objective of Mao Tse-tung and his group in the "first intermediary zone" is to establish hegemony in the national-liberation movement in these parts of the world and unite all the under-developed countries there under its leadership. Peking is exerting a tremendous effort to get the peoples of these continents to break away from the world socialist system, particularly the Soviet Union, and the international communist movement.

For tactical reasons Chinese foreign policy tries to turn the anti-colonial orientation of the national-liberation movement into anti-Western and racial channels. In some cases the Chinese Communist Party leaders ignore the social aspect of Afro-Asian unity substituting the idea of racial unity or common destiny in the face of the "white" world for its anti-imperialist, anti-colonial basis. The experience of the Chinese revolution, considered to be absolute, and Peking's petty-bourgeois views on socialist construction are set against the experience of the world proletariat, the experience of socialist construction in the Soviet Union and the East European socialist countries.

On the other hand, China's foreign policy must counter the attempts of the imperialist countries, above all the United States, to influence the economic and socio-political development of the developing countries. While being an actually anti-imperialist tendency, it is closely tied in with China's nationalist objectives regarding the "first intermediary zone." By fanning anti-American sentiments among the peoples the Chinese leaders hope to use the national-liberation movement as a means of influencing the United States. In other words, they seek to suit the anti-colonial struggle to its narrow nationalist interests.

China is actively vying for influence in the "third world"—the young nations that have taken the path of independent development. In some of these countries that have not established diplomatic relations with China it resorts to "people's diplomacy," economic pressure and political struggle, to inciting the nationalist aspirations of local leaders. China's economic policy with regard to the developing countries, its desire to develop contacts in this sphere is part of its general strategic plan for that area of the world. The chief purpose of developing such contacts is to pave the way for ideological and political penetration and consolidation of its positions there.

Unlike the assistance from other socialist countries to strengthen the young nations' economic independence from imperialism, China's aid mainly serves the interests of propaganda. The Chinese leaders try to pursuade the Afro-Asian countries to build projects which take less time to be started and repaid. As a result, China's programme of economic assistance provides for no heavy industry projects whatsoever (iron and steel plants and fuel industry enterprises).

Therefore this assistance does not significantly contribute to improving the economic structure of Asian and African countries. Meanwhile the Chinese leaders strive to hamper or even destroy the economic contacts between the young nations and the socialist camp, particularly the Soviet Union, and thus put China in an exclusive position among the countries of the "third world."

A conspicuous role in the policy for the "first intermediary zone" is assigned to the principle of "reliance on one's own strength," which is being forced on the leaders of the developing countries as a decisive condition for attaining economic independence. In conjunction with the principles with regard to Chinese assistance, this denotes Peking's desire to present China as the only socialist country selflessly helping the young nations attain economic independence thus discrediting the assistance of other socialist countries as a manifestation of neo-colonialism.

The struggle for hegemony which the Mao group is waging in the countries of the "first intermediary zone" expresses its opposition to the leading role of the international proletariat in the national-liberation movement. This reactionary, petty-bourgeois orientation fits in with the policy of the national bourgeoisie who tries to halt or prevent non-capitalist development in the emergent countries. Thus it is not only in the political and ideological but also in the socio-economic aspects that China's anti-Soviet, anti-socialist policy renders priceless assistance to imperialists in

their attempts to channel the young nations' development towards capitalism.

Relations with the Countries of the "Second Intermediary Zone" (West European capitalist countries, Japan, Australia and Canada). In keeping with its theory of "intermediary zones", China has a different approach to the United States than to the rest of the imperialist world. While pursuing an outwardly hostile policy towards the United States, it obviously seeks mutual understanding and cooperation with the rest of the imperialist world.

Alongside the attempt to use intra-imperialist contradictions to increase pressure on the United States in order to promote China's nationalist claims in the international arena, the policy of cooperation with the rest of the imperialist world has other important objectives. Among other things it is out to mobilize the traditional anti-socialist forces of the capitalist world in the struggle against the Soviet Union and to compensate for the political and, particularly, economic damage China has suffered due to Mao's isolationist policy.

The nature of these objectives dictates the unscrupulousness of Chinese policy with regard to the capitalist countries. Thus, seeking to curry favour from the monopoly bourgeoisie, Mao Tse-tung openly supported the revanchist aspirations of Federal Germany's ruling quarters. He also supported the territorial claims by Japanese reactionaries on the Soviet Union. Peking has displayed readiness to hamper the working people's struggle against the monopoly bourgeoisie and even tried to assist in frustrating the strike of government employees in Japan in April, 1964.

Despite its flirting with the ruling classes of capitalist countries, Peking has only managed to get eight capitalist states to recognize the Chinese People's Republic. But this does not prevent the Chinese leaders and the capitalist governments expanding contacts and especially foreign trade on the principle of "politics should be separated from economics," which was effectively applied to Sino-Japanese relations. The absence of diplomatic relations does not discourage Federal Germany, Japan, Italy, Australia and Canada from trading with China. In many cases the bourgeois governments which refrain from trading with China on an official, state basis, encourage private firms to do so.

In their dealings with the advanced capitalist countries the Chinese leaders prefer Japan. In isolating China from the socialist community they believed that trade with Japan would make up for the deliveries of plant to China. In this matter Mao Tse-tung and his supporters demonstrated more openly than before their disregard for the principles of socialist foreign policy and proletarian solidarity. Beside supporting Japan's territorial claims on the Soviet Union they promised unilaterally that if a Sino-Japanese friendship and non-aggression treaty were signed the article in the Soviet-Chinese agreement of February 14, 1950 on preventing the restoration of Japanese militarism "would naturally lose its validity." In order to speed up rapprochement with the Japanese monopoly bourgeoisie they advanced a thesis on the racial affinity of the Japanese and Chinese peoples—the basis on which they would draw closer together. They also tried to interest the Japanese ruling quarters in the idea of joint

leadership of Asia and the prospect of attaining prosperity through economic and political cooperation.

The ruling Liberal Democratic Party of Japan, bound as it is to the United States, did not risk a radical change in Sino-Japanese relations. Furthermore, the Japanese leaders themselves crave a leading position in Asia and are naturally apprehensive of China's hegemonic schemes. However, since 1961, i.e., from the time the differences between the Chinese leaders and the socialist countries became evident, the government of Japan began to offer China better terms of trade despite the risk of displeasing its American patrons.

Japan became China's chief capitalist trading partner, doing more business with China than with the other socialist countries.

The Chinese government hopes to develop economic relations with other capitalist countries in a similar manner.

Having abandoned the principles of socialist community, it has been forced to humble itself before the imperialists, who naturally hope to benefit from this not only by way of profits but also politically. In 1966 the volume of trade with the capitalist countries came to 75 per cent of China's total foreign trade turnover compared with 32 per cent in 1958.

Today China almost entirely depends on capitalist supplies of plant, fertilizers, farm machinery and even grain, the demand for which is still far from being met due to repeated crop failures and also as a result of the government's adventurous policy with regard to agriculture and social transformations.

It is no exaggeration to state that China's foreign policy in the "second intermediary zone," which counts on exploiting the economic resources and political potential of the imperialist countries in the struggle for world hegemony, practically results in economic and even political dependence on the imperialist camp, in the converging of China's policy with the anti-socialist line of the imperialist governments.

Relations with the Socialist Community. Theoretically, the "intermediary zones" concept sets the socialist countries against American imperialism but assigns them the role of a secondary object of American aggressive policy. Despite its anti-American camouflage this concept possesses an anti-Soviet potential, since it expresses Peking's aspirations for a clash between the world's two mightiest powers. Secondly, it minimizes or even ignores the significance of the socialist community in the struggle against imperialism. Thirdly, it implies the possibility of pitting the socialist camp as a whole or an individual socialist country against the "intermediary zones" the way the Chinese leaders oppose the "zones" to the United States.

Mao Tse-tung and his supporters do not regard the socialist countries as a union of socially homogeneous states, connected with the Chinese People's Republic by a similarity of class goals, economic basis and ideology, but as an arena of struggle for hegemony. This is evident from their territorial claims on other socialist countries.

To have a free hand in operating their special policy the Chinese rulers proceeded to isolate themselves from the socialist camp and even declared in 1964, through Foreign Minister Chen

Yi, that China was to be referred to as a non-aligned state. Placing the narrow nationalist interests of the Chinese state above all, they have practically rejected proletarian internationalism as a basis of relations among the socialist countries. The idea of priority of national interests over common interests has been expressed in the notorious principle of "reliance on one's own strength." It is only on the basis of completely acting on their own, the Maoists assert, will the socialist countries be able to build their relations on an equal footing.

The Chinese leaders try to put across their principle of "reliance on one's own strength" despite the fact that if every socialist country were to build a complete economic complex that would be connected with the others only through trade, it would amount to disregarding the objective laws of socialist development and the common interests of the struggle against imperialism in the very important, economic sphere.

As a matter of fact Peking's utterances on equality and independence of the socialist countries do not prevent it from working for hegemony and pursuing a policy of split. They are busy searching for supporters of their petty-bourgeois extremist platform and nationalist anti-Soviet policy in the socialist countries, ready to seize on and activate whatever nationalist forces may emerge. This orientation was most vividly manifested in the attempt to separate the Asian socialist countries into an independent bloc led by China on the basis of the "common destiny" thesis. This attempt involved inciting nationalist sentiments, spreading propaganda on the decisive role of the Asian anti-colonial struggle for world revolution, inculcating the Mao cult and Maoism in these countries and trying to establish pro-Chinese groups in the Communist Party leaderships.

The Chinese government would like the support of the Asian socialist countries in its policy of setting East against West, of neutralizing the socially and economically advanced socialist countries of Eastern Europe—the main stumbling block in its great-power schemes on the international scene.

The concept of "bourgeois degeneration" of some socialist countries and Communist Parties is used to cover up the nationalist policy China follows in the socialist camp. In its pretensions to leadership in the world revolutionary process the Chinese leaders regard the attitude to China, or to be more exact, to their ideological stand and political line as the criterion of revolutionary reliability. Maoism is presented as the only guarantee against revisionism.

A logical consequence of this approach is the tactic of "excommunicating" certain countries from the socialist camp, "expelling" them from the anti-imperialist front, making them the main political enemy along with the United States and "shifting" them from the "socialist wing" of the "intermediary zone" to the "imperialist wing". This tactic found expression in the demand for "ideological and organization partition" from "modern revisionism," in the rejection of joint anti-imperialist actions with the socialist countries under the ridiculous pretext of the latter's "degeneration" and "complicity" with American imperialism.

The Maoist anti-Soviet policy is the quintessence of the policy of anti-socialism. Anti-Sovietism, as well as anti-Americanism, is a pivotal doctrine in China's nationalist platform. The Mao group needs it to keep the Chinese from the influence of the international proletariat. Anti-Sovietism is a new "Chinese Wall" the Peking chauvinists want to erect between its people and socialism, permitting them to go ahead unhindered with their petty-bourgeois adventures at home and on a world scale.

Whether the Mao group wish it or not, anti-Sovietism is a great service to imperialism, particularly to the American ruling circles, inasmuch as it bears out the theoretical speculations on the "erosion of communism" and supports hopes for a nationalist upsurge of some contingents of the world communist movement.

For Mao and his yes-men anti-Sovietism inside China is a means of building up the nationalist forces and perpetuating Mao's personal dictatorship. Such is the essence of the so-called "cultural revolution."

By whipping up anti-Sovietism the Mao clique intend to instil in the Chinese people the "encirclement complex," the feeling of external danger. They hope this will distract the Chinese people from the real problems which have been engendered by the objective conditions of socialist construction and accentuated by the leadership's erroneous policy, to justify the need for the military and bureaucratic dictatorship and militarization of all aspects of life there and create a favourable atmosphere to stamp out opposition.

Finally, the Chinese leaders' anti-Sovietism is not merely a category of nationalism, a manifestation of national prejudice reflected in international affairs. This orientation is chiefly meant to help them gain hegemony in the world revolutionary process, i.e., subordinate the interests of the other socialist countries, fraternal parties and all forces of the revolutionary and liberation movement to their special policy and great-power ambitions. In their struggle for hegemony the Chinese leaders cannot do without working against the Soviet Union and the Leninist principles of equality and mutual understanding in the communist movement, without attempting to discredit the USSR and the CPSU. The platform of anti-Sovietism is the basis for the Chinese leaders' subversive activity in the international working-class and communist movements. Anti-Sovietism is a way of driving a wedge between the forces of the national-liberation movement and the international proletariat. The fight against "modern revisionism" is a means of justifying China's vanguardist claims.

Great-Power Chauvinism—the Motive Force of Mao's Policy in International Affairs

The Maoist claims to hegemony in the world revolutionary process—a paradoxical form of "revolutionary" vanguardism—is a remarkable feature and modern expression of traditional Chinese nationalism and great-power chauvinism.

Although the Chinese leaders have time and again assured that their ideological and political struggle is not for the purpose of gaining leadership, their practical activities show plainly enough that their aim is to have a decisive say in the world revolutionary process.

Another noteworthy point is that, trying to justify their claims, the Chinese leaders are holding forth on the intransient significance of their revolutionary experience for all the peoples (since the revolution in China occurred later than in other countries, i.e., in more progressive sociohistorical conditions), their highly revolutionary spirit (since the Chinese revolution, as they see it, is an expression of the most acute contradiction of our time) and the Chinese Communists' mission of defending Marxism-Leninism from what they call "modern revisionism."

Despite the ultra-revolutionary phraseology of the Chinese "anti-revisionist" programme it is becoming increasingly clear that winning hegemony in the world revolutionary process is an important but not the ultimate objective of its long-range plans.

Peking's vanguardist claims stem from the desire to restore China's former grandeur in accordance with modernized sinocentric ideas and feudal-chauvinistic concepts which for ages have been cultivated among the aboriginal Chinese (Han) population. This tendency became especially pronounced during the people's democratic revolution and today is understood as the historical mission of the present generation of Chinese people. As a matter of fact, this is the actual, although camouflaged, political goal of the Chinese leadership with the following objectives:

Restoration of all territory that had been part of the former Chinese Empire; restoration of the Chinese state's military and political might to an extent where it would be possible to use dictate in international relations (as was the case in the period of flourishing feudalism);

Restoration of China's influence on neighbouring countries and peoples—former vassals of China and extending this influence to more distant parts of the world on the basis of "common destiny of coloured peoples" in the face of "white" imperialism;

Restoration of the prestige China enjoyed at certain historical periods with certain Asian countries because of its cultural, political and economic development.

Such a programme bespeaks the chauvinistic nature of the Chinese leaders' foreign policy.

Maoist neo-chauvinism is combined with the objective trend to socialism in China's development and even tries to lean on it. Another noteworthy feature is its implementation within the framework of the world revolutionary process and the revolutionary phraseology used to camouflage its meaning. In order to achieve their chauvinistic ends the Chinese leaders seek to capitalize on the socialist organization of society while arbitrarily subordinating the cause of socialist construction in the country to nationalist interests.

Historically this situation cannot be explained exclusively by the petty-bourgeois instability and unscrupulousness of Peking politicians and the fact that socialism today by virtue of its attractive force is the most convenient screen for nationalist aims. Then, too, a problem of such scope as establishment of the Chinese people's sovereignty cannot be solved along the lines of capitalist development no matter what elements are included. China's shift to capitalism would have resulted in its enslavement by advanced capitalist countries, whereas its shift to socialism resulted in an unprecedented growth of international prestige within the first ten years after the revolution.

The Peking leaders are perfectly aware of this fact. They have more than once formulated the idea of the dependence of China's destiny on the outcome of the bourgeois-democratic ("neo-democratic") revolution and moreover, on the triumph of socialism in China. They also plan to base the struggle for nationalist objectives in international affairs on the success in socialist construction.

This policy is seriously damaging the cause of socialism in the world and in China itself: the policy of self-isolation from the socialist system and autarchy slows down the rates of economic and social development. From the standpoint of China's place in the world socialist system, this also hits at economic competition between socialism and capitalism. Finally, the idea of socialist development is being discredited in the eyes of the emergent nations which are faced with the alternative of choosing between the socialist and capitalist ways of development.

As a consequence of all this, not only the national interests of the Chinese people but also the cause of socialist construction in China and the interests of the world socialist system and anti-imperialist struggle are being sacrificed to the nationalist objectives of Chinese foreign policy.

Obviously this situation is an expression of the existing contradictions in the economic basis of the so-called democratic dictatorship of the people in China—a state of the transition period. Apart from serving the interests of the proletariat this state also serves the interests of the numerous petty bourgeoisie in town and village and even the interests of the national bourgeoisie partly admitted to state power. The influence of the non-proletarian classes increases as the result of the leaders having abandoned the socialist principles in their home and foreign policies thereby weakening the influence of the Chinese and international proletariat on the country's socio-economic development, protracting the transition period and hampering the growth of socialist elements.

Behind the screen of socialist ideas the Mao group seek leadership in the world communist movement believing it to be a way of attaining their great-power nationalist purposes.

In seeking to gain its chauvinistic ends and following an anti-Soviet line in international relations, Chinese politicians are forced to resort to various means: demagogy, reliance on reactionary forces, unscrupulous political tricks. All this contributes to the many-sided picture of China's relations with the external world.

Chinese foreign policy is calculated for decades to come. It is based on the plan of winning hegemony in the world and winning it, as the Maoists believe, in the process of revolutionary transformation of the planet.

Nationalism manifested today in great-power aspirations engendered by certain historical and social factors is the ideological foundation of China's foreign policy. The contradictions between the nationalist foreign policy and the socialist trends inside the country reflect the contradictions in the economic basis of a state in a transitional period.

The ousting of nationalism from China's policies will apparently be a lengthy process of overcoming petty-bourgeois and bourgeois dominance in Chinese society accompanied by the growth of socialist elements within the country and the influence of the international proletariat from without.